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Bankruptcy
By W. Homer Drake, Jr.* and James E. Massey**

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided few cases involving
the Bankruptcy Act' in 1976. Of these, only nine merit special attention.
The right to file a bankruptcy petition without being fired was the subject of McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co.2 Nothing in the U.S.
Constitution or the Bankruptcy Act prohibits an employer from firing an
employee who files a voluntary bankruptcy petition. The McLellan case,
however, held that a plaintiff states a claim for relief under the Civil Rights
Act of 18611 by alleging that his employer deprived him of his civil rights
by firing him after he filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition.
Affirming the district court, the Fifth Circuit held that the amended
complaint in McLellan failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C.A. §1983,
since that section requires state action. "A private corporate utility company is not brought within the purview of state action merely because it
is state regulated," the Court of Appeals said.' But it reversed the balance
of the district court's opinion. The district court had dismissed the plaintiff's amended complaint, which added a union as a defendant, on the
ground that leave of court had not been obtained but was required for the
amendment under Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
case thus presented a conflict between Rule 15(a), which provides that a
complaint may be amended at any time before a responsive pleading is
served, and Rule 21, which requires leave of court to add or drop a party.
The Fifth Circuit held that Rule 15 takes precedence, since "pleadings are
not an end in themselves, but are only a means to the proper presentation
of the case." 5
Having determined that the added party was a proper defendant, the
Fifth Circuit next turned to whether a claim had been stated under
* Partner in the law firm of Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Atlanta, Georgia. United
States Bankruptcy Judge, Northern District of Georgia (1964-1976); Adjunct Professor of
Law, Emory University. A.B., Mercer University (1954); LL.B., Mercer University (1956).
Member of the Georgia Bar.
** Associate with the law firm of Redfern, Butler & Morgan, Atlanta, Georgia. A.B.,
Emory University (1965); LL.B., Columbia University (1968). Member of the Georgia and
New York Bars.
1. U.S.C.A. tit. 11 (1966).
2. 526 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1976).
3. 42 U.S.C.A. §1985 (1974).
4. 526 F.2d at 872.
5. Id. at 873, quoting 3 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTcE §15.02[1] at 813 (2d ed. 1974).
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§1985(3).' The four elements necessary to state a claim under that section
are:
(1) There must be a conspiracy by the defendants;
(2) Its purpose must be to deprive, either directly or indirectly,
a person or class of persons of "equal protection of the laws, or of
equal privileges and immunities under the law;"
(3) One or more of the conspirators must do something to further the conspiracy; and
(4) As a consequence of that act, another person must be
"injured in his personal property" or "deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States."
The U.S. Supreme Court had decided in Griffin v.Breckenridge7 that a
private conspiracy was sufficient to state a claim under the Civil Rights
Act of 1861 and that the prerequisite of intent to deprive a person of
"equal" protection or "equal" privileges and immunities means that there
must be some invidious discrimination in the conspirators' action. The
Supreme Court had, however, stopped short of determining whether a
conspiracy motivated by factors other than race could form the basis for a
claim under §1985(3). The McLellan case is significant because it answered that question. It held that allegations of nonracial, class-based,
invidiously discriminatory conduct can form the basis of a §1985(3) claim:
The language of §1985(3) gives no indication that racial discrimination is
a requisite element of a cause of action, thereunder. To engraft such a
limitation would bring the statute into anomalous contrast with comparable Reconstruction civil rights legislation, under which a wide variety of
nonracial classes have won relief from discriminatory treatment. We
therefore hold that in order to come within §1985(3), it is unnecessary for
plaintiff to be the subject of racial discrimination.8
The Fifth Circuit had no problem finding that the plaintiff's complaint in
McLellan met the §1985(3) prerequisite that the discrimination be classbased. The allegation that all employees filing bankruptcy petitions would
be discharged as a matter of policy would subject a class which is "neither
imaginary nor uncertain" to discrimination.' Section 1985(3) further says
that a class must have a particular right that gives it a reason for protection. The Fifth Circuit found such a right in the overriding federal concern,
embodied in the Bankruptcy Act and articulated by the Supreme Court,
that debtors be given "'a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future
effort unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing
6.
7.
8.
9.

42 U.S.C.A. §1985(3) (1974).
403 U.S. 88 (1971).
526 F.2d at 876 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 878.
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debt."" 0 The court noted that in recent years the Supreme Court had
offered special protection to persons discriminated against because of their
distressed financial condition. That trend supports the result in McLellan,
said the court, even though there was no need to decide "to what extent
the impoverished are a class deserving of a high level of protection under
the equal protection clause.""
Lastly, the court held that the discriminatory intent necessary for
§1985(3) liability must be "invidious." Thus, the burden would be on the
plaintiff "to show that the policy of discharging employees who file voluntary bankruptcy petitions is not justifiable in light of the necessities of
[Mississippi Power & Light's] business, or that it is irrational. The defendants, in turn, will be entitled to present evidence that the policy serves
the interest of its business sufficiently to outweigh the injury inflicted upon
the plaintiff."' 2
The remainder of the court's opinion in McLellan deals with the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1861 as applied by the Supreme
Court. The court found that the application of the statute was constitutional. It noted that Congress had the authority to establish the bankruptcy laws and that, under the Necessary and Proper Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, 3 "the bankruptcy power manifestly vests Congress with the
power, via civil remedies, to discourage people from conspiring to interfere
4
with efforts of individuals to obtain discharges in bankruptcy."'
Reversing the decision of the panel in In re Samuels & Co., "5the court
of appeals sitting en banc adopted as its opinion the earlier dissenting
opinion of Judge Godbold." This case raised the question whether the
interest of an unpaid cash seller in goods already delivered to a buyer is
superior to the interest of a holder of a perfected security interest in afteracquired property. Judge Godbold said the perfected security interest is
"unquestionably superior" to the interest of the seller." This opinion was
discussed in some detail in last year's survey. 8
In RIDC Industrial Development Fund v. Snyder," the Fifth Circuit
held that the participation of a creditor, both as a secured and unsecured
10. Id., quoting Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 648 (1971) (citations omitted).
11. 526 F.2d at 879.
12. Id.
13. U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8.
14. 526 F.2d at 880 (footnote omitted).
15. 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1976).
16.

510 F.2d 139, 154 (5th Cir. 1975).

17. Id. at 154.
18. Drake & Massey, Bankruptcy, 1975 Fifth Circuit Survey, 27 MaE. L. REv. 867, 882886 (1976).
19.

539 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1976).
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creditor in Chapter XI proceedings, did not affect the liability of a guarantor of the debtor's obligation to that creditor. Snyder had guaranteed the
debt of the Chapter XI debtor, Sunny Hill Research and Manufacturing
Company, to RIDC. The indebtedness was secured by certain equipment
and inventory. The guarantor as well as RIDC consented to a six-month
moratorium on Sunny Hill's obligation and to the sale of certain assets
subject to RIDC's security interest. In June, 1968, Sunny Hill filed a Chapter XI petition. The plan of arrangement provided for a payment schedule
and further provided that 'any indebtedness. . remaining unpaid after
the last of the distributions . . . shall be cancelled, discharged and extinguished."'"0
The district court held that RIDC as a secured creditor was outside the
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and that because the balance of the
debt was discharged, the guarantor had no liability on the balance of the
unpaid debt. That court further held that §16 of the Bankruptcy Act,2 '
providing that liability of the guarantor is unaffected by discharge, was
inapplicable because the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to discharge
a secured debt. The creditor's acceptance of the plan, however, was held
to be a contractual agreement that could effect such a discharge.
The Fifth Circuit held that the bankruptcy courts may have jurisdiction
over secured creditors in Chapter XI proceedings at least insofar as those
creditors are partially unsecured. In that connection, the court limited the
dicta in the case of In re Texas Consumer Finance Corp.,2 in which the
court had said, "No provision of the Act permits an arrangement proposed
under Chapter XI to deal with the rights of the secured creditors or with
the rights of stockholders. '"21 Obviously, to the extent that a secured creditor is unsecured, a bankruptcy court may deal with its claim. The court
also limited dicta in the Texas Consumer case relating to the ability of the
court to restrain secured creditors in Chapter XI proceedings. A secured
creditor does not jeopardize its claim by participating as an unsecured
creditor to the extent that the amount of the debt exceeds the value of the
collateral. "While it is clear that a bankruptcy court lacks jurisdiction
under Chapter XI to compel a secured creditor to participate in an arrangement that alters his security interest," the court said, "the present
case raises the question of whether the Court has jurisdiction to allow him
to participate without sacrificing other legal rights. ' 24 Since permitting
voluntary participation would serve the purpose of increasing the value of
the debtor's estate and of allowing the debtor to continue in business, the
court concluded that "[a]llowing a secured creditor to voluntarily join in
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 490 (footnote omitted).
11 U.S.C.A. §34 (1953).
480 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1973).
Id. at 1265.
539 F.2d at 493.
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an arrangement may facilitate completion of the Chapter XI process by
allowing compromise among the interested parties on [the] issues [of the
'
validity of a lien or the extent to which the lien covers the property]." 25
The court's reasoning is unassailable:
To limit the secured creditors to foreclosure followed by filing of a claim
for the unsecured balance or surrender of the security followed by filing
for the whole claim as an unsecured creditor would undermine the Chapter XI purpose of maintaining a viable business, when feasible, to benefit
all creditors and the debtor. If the business is worth more as a going
concern than it would bring in liquidation, then it is also to the guarantor's
advantage to allow this option since more of the debt will be paid by the
debtor."'
The case of Moureau v. Leaseamatic, Inc. 2 illustrates the danger of a
common error of bankruptcy practitioners in filing schedules of creditors.
Leaseamatic, the creditor, obtained an order from the bankruptcy court
declaring the indebtedness of Moureau to be non-dischargeable under
§17a(3) of the Bankruptcy Act, 2 which provides: "A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, whether
allowable in full or in part, except such as . . . (3) have not been duly
scheduled in time for proof and allowance, with the name of the creditor,
if known to the bankrupt, unless such creditor has notice or actual knowledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy . . . ." Moreau had been sued by
Leaseamatic in a state court in late 1973, although service of process was
not obtained until April 16, 1974. On March 4, 1974, Moreau filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition. Although Leaseamatic had made formal demand
for payment numerous times, Moureau failed to disclose on his bankruptcy
schedules the indebtedness or the fact that he had leased certain equipment from Leaseamatic or the fact that there was a pending state court
proceeding. On April 25, 1974, Moreau received the discharge, and the
following day he filed an answer in the state court proceeding reciting the
issuance of a stay order in the bankruptcy proceedings as a defense. The
answer, however, did not disclose the discharge. On June 25, 1974, he
amended his answer to disclose the discharge and alleged it as a bar to the
recovery. The following month Leaseamatic filed its complaint to determine the dischargeability of the debt, and the bankruptcy court held that
the debt was non-dischargeable. The district court and the court of appeals
affirmed. The bankrupt argued that since the time for filing proofs of claim
had not expired, he should receive a discharge. The court of appeals dis25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 494 (footnote omitted).
Id. (footnotes omitted).
542 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1976).
11 U.S.C.A. §35a(3) (Supp. 1976).
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agreed. It held that a creditor must receive actual notice "in ample time
fully to protect his rights."'" Thus, it is not simply the ability to file a proof
of claim that is controlling. Rather, the debtor must carefully schedule his
creditors so that they can participate throughout the proceedings.
Baum v. Anderson" held that a Chapter XI debtor is not entitled to the
dismissal of a state court foreclosure proceeding but merely to a stay of
those proceedings. The defendant in Baum filed the foreclosure proceedings after the filing of the debtor's Chapter XI petition. Although there was
conflicting testimony, the courts below held that the foreclosure action was
filed in good faith without knowledge of those proceedings. Nonetheless,
the debtor contended that the state court proceedings should be dismissed
and a sanction should be levied against the creditor. In a well-reasoned
opinion, the court of appeals held that the policy underlying §11a of the
Act,3' on which the various stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Rules of
Procedure are based, is to protect the bankrupt from harrassment. Since
the Bankruptcy Rules provide for an automatic stay, the debtor had obtained protection equivalent to that which he would have obtained had the
state court action been dismissed. Accordingly, the court of appeals ruled
that dismissal was not mandatory. The court did direct the entry of a
formal order for the benefit of state officers, who would, without the issuance of a formal stay, be required under state law to take certain actions.
The teaching of Pyramid Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Speake23 is that the
Bankruptcy Rules relating to appeals may not be ignored with impunity.
Pyramid had been adjudged a bankrupt on April 14, 1973, after a trial. It
filed a notice of appeal to the district court nine days later, but it was some
two months later before the bankrupt ordered a transcript. The court
reporter, who was owed approximately $1,000, requested a payment before
commencing the transcription. There was no further contact between the
court reporter and the bankrupt's counsel for two months. On September
9, 1975, the receiver moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of prosecution,
and the district court entered a "conditional order of dismissal" giving the
bankrupt until September 18, 1975, to file the record. On September 25,
that order was amended extending the time to October 21. On October 21,
Pyramid requested an additional twenty days on the ground that only onethird of the transcript had been prepared. The district court granted the
motion to dismiss the appeal. Affirming, the Fifth Circuit took pains to
point out that even the notice of appeal to it was not filed until the very
last day. The court said Bankruptcy Rule 806 requires that the transcript
29.
30.
31.
32.

542 F.2d at 253.
541 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1976).
11 U.S.C.A. §29a (1966).
531 F.2d 743 (5th Cir. 1976).
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be ordered immediately and that the appellant make satisfactory arrangements for paying the cost of the transcript, and allows extensions of time
to be granted only if good cause is shown. Good cause is not shown, according to the court, if there is a "gross lack of diligence or dilatory maneuvering."" The court summarized the policy underlying the need for dispatch
as follows: "Precisely because the filing of a notice of appeal is such a
simple matter, and because of the inherent prejudice to creditors when the
estate of a bankrupt is subject to dissipation by expenses incurred each
additional day, some device is necessary to insure that appeals taken are
'34
diligently prosecuted.
Recognizing that the conduct of appellant's counsel might punish an
innocent client, the court pointed out that the dismissal was discretionary
and that a district court might consider "the prejudicial effect of delay on
the appellee and the bona fides of the appellant" in deciding such a motion ."
Mioton v. Mulla3 is of only passing interest, except perhaps to Louisiana
lawyers. In that case, certain assets subject to a usufruct under Louisiana
law at the time of the bankrupt's adjudication vested a few years later. The
bankrupt petitioned the bankruptcy court to reopen his case to determine
the status of the assets and in that petition contended that the trustee had
abandoned the property by his failure to administer it. The Fifth Circuit
held that while the property could not be sold until the usufruct ended and
the assets were distributed to the bankrupt, the assets remained in his
estate and the trustee did all that he could under the circumstances, which
was simply to wait. Thus, the court concluded that the trustee had not
abandoned the property.
In Murphy v. IRS, 37 the Fifth Circuit affirmed a determination that a
tax penalty under 26 U.S.C.A. §6672 was a nondischargeable debt. The
court held that liability under §6672 is a nondischargeable debt governed
by 11 U.S.C.A. §35(a) rather than a dischargeable penalty governed by
11 U.S.C.A. §93(j). The court also held that a bankruptcy court has
jurisdiction, upon the application of a bankrupt, to determine the dischargeability of a tax assessment.8

33. Id. at 745.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 746.
36. 526 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1976).
37. 533 F.2d 940 (5th Cir. 1976).
38. The court cited In re Durensky, 519 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1975), discussed in last year's
survey: Drake & Massey, Bankruptcy, 1975 Fifth Circuit Survey, 27 MER. L. REv. 867, 870
(1976).
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In Federal NationalMortgage Ass'n v. Delaney,3 the Fifth Circuit held
that Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act" gives a bankruptcy court jurisdiction to permit enforcement of a lien securing payment of attorney fees
provided for in a mortgage contract; whether such a lien should be enforced
is a matter left to the court's discretion. In Delaney, the debtor had been
operating under a Chapter XIII plan and had been making mortgage payments for some time. In 1974, the debtor stopped making payments, so the
mortgagee sought a lifting of the stay. The bankruptcy court denied that
relief but only on the condition that the arrearages be paid within ninety
days. The arrearages were paid, but the mortgagee then sought attorney
fees as provided in the mortgage contract. The bankruptcy court denied
the application on the ground that the indebtedness for attorney fees had
not existed at the time the petition was filed. On appeal, the mortgagee
contended that the bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction to modify the
terms of the contract, since debts secured by real property are not affected
by Chapter XIII.
The Fifth Circuit agreed with the mortgagee that the bankruptcy court
could not modify the mortgage contract. The only power relevant, the Fifth
Circuit said, was the bankruptcy court's power over the debtor's property.
Hence, the court concluded, the bankruptcy court had discretion only to
permit foreclosure or to stay foreclosure. The "usual rule that bankruptcy
proceedings suspend the rights and obligations between a creditor and his
debtors"" does not apply in Chapter XIII proceedings, since a creditor
secured by real property has no right to participate in the proceedings and,
indeed, gets no notice of it. The court remanded the case to the bankruptcy
court to determine whether it would exercise its discretion to permit the
mortgagee to show the amount due for attorney fees and to permit foreclosure. If the bankruptcy court should decide to forbid foreclosure, the court
pointed out, the mortgagee would have to wait until the Chapter XIII
proceedings are concluded to enforce its rights in the absence of a contractual right to attorney fees under state law.
39.
40.
41.

534 F.2d 645 (5th Cir. 1976).
11 U.S.C.A. §§1001-1086 (1970).
534 F.2d at 647.

